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Abstract
Standard (S,s) models of lumpy investment allow us to match many as-
pects of the micro data, but it is well known that the implied interest rate
sensitivity of investment is unrealistically large. The monetary transmission
mechanism is therefore a particularly clean experiment to assess the macro-
economic relevance of any investment theory. Our results show that lumpy
investment can coexist with a realistic monetary transmission mechanism,
but that we are nevertheless still a step away from a micro-founded theory of
monetary policy.
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1 Introduction
What explains the short-run effects of monetary policy on real variables of interest?
This question takes center-stage in much of the literature in macroeconomics. In
the words of Galí (2015): "Over the past two decades, monetary economics has
been among the most fruitful research areas within macroeconomics. The efforts of
many researchers to understand the relationship among monetary policy, inflation,
and the business cycle have led to the development of a framework - the so called
New Keynesian model - that is widely used for monetary policy analysis." Our mo-
tivation to reconsider this question originates in a well-known micro-macro puzzle
in investment theory. In fact, (S,s)1 models of lumpy investment allow us to match
many aspects of the micro data, but the implied interest rate sensitivity of invest-
ment is unrealistically large (see, e.g., Thomas 2002 and Khan and Thomas 2008).
It therefore seems to us that the monetary transmission mechanism is a particularly
clean experiment to assess the macroeconomic relevance of any investment theory.
For instance, Reiter et al. (2013) have shown that once an otherwise conventional
NK model is augmented with a lumpy investment decision à la Thomas (2002), the
implied monetary transmission mechanism becomes counterfactual. Specifically, the
impact responses of investment and output to a change in the nominal interest rate
become very large and the dynamic consequences of that shock are only short-lived.2
A drawback of our work in Reiter et al. (2013) is, however, that the micro
data on investment could not be fitted in a satisfactory way by just relying on a
fixed adjustment cost for capital. The present paper therefore develops a HANK3
1The nature of optimal microeconomic decisions implied by fixed adjustment costs is typically
referred to as (S,s), this way highlighting the range of inaction, which is a general feature of those
decisions (see, e.g., Dotsey et al. 1999).
2McKay andWieland (2019) show that this mechanism is also an important channel of monetary
policy transmission in a fixed-cost model of durable consumption demand.
3HANK stands for Heterogeneous Agent New Keynesian. This term has been popularized by
Kaplan et al. (2018).
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model consistent with the cross-sectional distribution of establishment investment
rates.4 To this end, we combine the investment model by Khan and Thomas (2008)
with a convex capital adjustment cost and integrate the resulting framework into
an otherwise standard NK model. More concretely, each investor is assumed to
face not only a fixed cost but also a convex cost of adjusting the capital stock, but
low-level investments are exempt from the fixed cost. There is also an idiosyncratic
shock to plant-level productivity. This set of assumptions allows us to match the
micro data on investment that have been established in the seminal work by Cooper
and Haltiwanger (2006). In this context, we also point at a problematic aspect
of the calibration in Khan and Thomas (2008). They target most of the micro-
facts on lumpy investment reported by Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006), but Khan
and Thomas (2008) ignore the serial correlation in investment rates. Making the
model consistent with the small and positive correlation reported by Cooper and
Haltiwanger (2006) requires, however, a substantial extension of the model proposed
by Khan and Thomas (2008), namely a combination of fixed and convex costs of
adjusting the capital stock. Our model solution relies on the methods developed in
Reiter (2009, 2010 and 2019).
But what does this imply for the monetary transmission mechanism? Under our
baseline calibration a quantitatively relevant monetary transmission mechanism can
coexist with lumpiness in investment at the micro level. In a nutshell, the intuition is
as follows. A convex capital adjustment cost incentivizes firms to smooth investment.
In the context of our quarterly model of the monetary transmission mechanism the
combined size of investment over a year can, however, still be substantial enough
to be consistent with both the investment spikes that are observed in the yearly
4That lumpiness is reported by, e.g., Doms and Dunne (1998), and Cooper and Haltiwanger
(2006). In the context of our theory there is no distinction between a plant and a firm and we
therefore use those terms interchangeably.
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data and the lack of persistence in annual investment rates at the firm level. When
we recalibrate our model in the spirit of Khan and Thomas (2008), i.e., assuming
much smaller capital adjustment costs (in our case, of course, both fixed and convex
costs) then our model can also generate negative investments (as well as investment
spikes) in the stationary distribution. However, the implied interest rate sensitivity
of investment becomes so large as to imply a counterfactual monetary transmission
mechanism. It is therefore fair to say that we are still a step away from a micro-
founded theory of monetary policy.
Let us relate our results to the literature. NK models often abstract from capital
accumulation,5 and if capital accumulation is taken into account in the context of
NK theory then it is common practice to postulate convex adjustment costs in the
investment block of the framework.6 But the existence of those adjustment costs
makes NK models inconsistent with the observed lumpiness in plant-level invest-
ment. An early attempt to make a NK model consistent with the lumpy nature of
investment at the micro level is the work in Sveen and Weinke (2007). In the latter
paper infrequent pricing and investment decisions are made in a Calvo (1983) fash-
ion, and this framework is shown to be observationally equivalent in the aggregate to
a model of convex capital adjustment costs at the firm-level, as in Woodford (2005).
One drawback of our 2007 paper is, however, that the step taken in the direction
of having an empirically relevant investment decision is relatively small compared
to the standard approach in modern investment theory. The theory of lumpy in-
vestment is an active of research, and the work in Winberry (2020) is an interesting
recent contribution to it. He studies, however, the dynamic consequences of tech-
nological shocks in an RBC framework, whereas our paper is concerned with the
5See, e.g., Galí (2015), among many others.
6For instance, Christiano et al. (2005) assume a convex investment adjustment cost, whereas
Woodford (2005) postulates a convex capital adjustment cost.
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monetary transmission mechanism. In the investment block of his model, Winberry
(2020) extends the model in Khan and Thomas (2008) by combining it with convex
capital adjustment costs. He also assumes habit formation in the preferences of the
representative household.7 In one of their robustness checks, Reiter et al. (2013)
had also combined fixed and convex costs of adjusting the capital stock. In that
paper, we pointed at a tension associated with having a substantial convex portion
of the capital adjustment cost. On the one hand, this gives rise to a realistic mone-
tary transmission mechanism. On the other hand, it makes the model inconsistent
with investment spikes at a quarterly frequency. In the present paper, we show that
a plausible model of the monetary transmission mechanism can coexist with the
lumpiness in yearly investment data that is documented in Cooper and Haltiwanger
(2006). The recently emerging HANK literature has mostly studied the aggregate
consequences of heterogeneity at the household level. A notable exception is the
paper by Ottonello and Winberry (2019). They analyze the monetary transmis-
sion mechanism in the presence of financial heterogeneity, but abstracting from the
lumpy nature of investment at the micro level. In the part of their paper that is
most related to our work, Koby and Wolf (2020) embed a rich heterogeneous-firm
block with lumpy firm investment into an otherwise standard medium-scale New
Keynesian model. Their heterogeneous-firm block is calibrated to be jointly consis-
tent with firm-level investment lumpiness and their novel evidence on investment
price elasticities. They study the response of aggregate investment to expansion-
ary monetary policy shocks over the business cycle, as a function of the underlying
cross-sectional distribution of capital, and they show that lumpiness of investment
can dampen the effectiveness of monetary policy in classical TFP recessions.
7In Winberry (2020), the consumption habit is important in order to generate a plausible
degree of volatility of the real interest rate. This is, of course, not an issue in the context of a New
Keynesian model.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model.
Section 3 presents the dynamic analysis, and section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
Our model integrates lumpy investment into an otherwise standard New Keynesian
model of the monetary transmission mechanism. There are households, intermediate
goods firms, retail firms and a central bank in charge of conducting monetary policy.
2.1 Households
Households are assumed to have access to a complete set of financial markets. The
representative household has the following period utility function
U (Ct, Lt) = lnCt −
ϕ
1 + 1/φ
L
1+1/φ
t , (1)
which is separable in its two arguments Ct and Lt. The former denotes a Dixit-
Stiglitz consumption aggregate while the latter is meant to indicate hours worked.
A household’s time endowment is normalized to one per period, and throughout
the analysis the subscript t denotes the time period. The steady state labor supply
elasticity is given by φ, and parameter ϕ is used to make sure that the representative
household spends one third of time working in the labor market. The consumption
aggregate reads
Ct ≡
(∫ 1
0
Ct (i)
ε−1
ε di
) ε
ε−1
, (2)
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where ε is the elasticity of substitution between different varieties of goods Ct (i).
The associated price index is defined as follows
Pt ≡
(∫ 1
0
Pt (i)
1−ε di
) 1
1−ε
, (3)
where Pt (i) is the price of good i. Requiring optimal allocation of any spending on
the available goods implies that consumption expenditure can be written as PtCt.
Households are assumed to maximize expected discounted utility
Et
∞∑
k=0
βkU (Ct+k, Lt+k) ,
where β is the subjective discount factor. The maximization is subject to a sequence
of budget constraints of the form
PtCt + Et {Qt,t+1Dt+1} ≤ Dt + PtwtLt + Tt, (4)
where Qt,t+1 denotes the stochastic discount factor for random nominal payments
and Dt+1 gives the nominal payoff associated with the portfolio held at the end of
period t. We have also used the notation wt for the real wage and Tt is nominal
dividend income resulting from ownership of firms.
The labor supply equation implied by this structure takes the standard form
ϕ CtL
1/φ
t = wt, (5)
and the consumer Euler equation is given by
QRt,t+1 = β
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−1
, (6)
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where QRt,t+1 ≡ Qt,t+1Πt+1 is the real stochastic discount factor, and Πt+1 ≡
Pt+1
Pt
is
the gross rate of inflation between periods t and t+1. We also note that Et {Qt,t+1} =
R−1t , where Rt is the gross risk free nominal interest rate.
2.2 Intermediate Good Firms
There is a continuum of intermediate good firms indexed on the unit interval. They
produce with capital and labor, and they face idiosyncratic shocks to their produc-
tivity. Let us note already that the relative intermediate good price is also the real
marginal cost for retail firms. A key difference with respect to the model proposed
in Khan and Thomas (2008) is that intermediate good firms are assumed to face
not only a fixed cost but also a convex cost of adjusting the capital stock. In each
period the time-line is as follows:
1. The idiosyncratic productivity shock realizes.
2. The firm chooses its current level of labor input, production takes place, and
workers are paid.
3. The fixed cost of adjusting the capital stock realizes.
4. The firm invests (or not).
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Each period, an intermediate good firm therefore solves a problem of the form8
maxEt
∞∑
k=0
QRt,t+k Dt+k
s.t.
Dt = q
M
t xtz0e
γtL̃νtK
α
t − wtL̃t −Ψ (Kt, Kt+1) ,
with
Ψ (Kt, Kt+1) =
 it + εψKt
(
it
Kt
)2
if it ∈ [aKt, bKt]
it + εψKt
(
it
Kt
)2
+ ftwt if it /∈ [aKt, bKt] ,
(7)
and
it = γKt+1 − (1− δ)Kt. (8)
All variables measured in units of output are defined as a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate
of the same form as the consumption aggregate. An intermediate good firm’s capital
stock,Kt, evolves according to (8), where it is its current investment, and δ ∈ (0, 1) is
the rate of capital depreciation. The growth rate of labor-augmenting technological
progress is γ−1, and all variables measured in units of output are deflated by the level
of labor-augmenting technological progress. Equation (7) reflects the restrictions
on an intermediate good firm’s capital adjustment. Specifically, investments that
are suffi ciently minor relative to the existing capital are only subject to a convex
adjustment cost. The latter is measured in terms of the aggregate good, and it is
given by εψKt
(
it
Kt
)2
, with parameter εψ ≥ 0. The range of exemption is defined
by parameters a and b, with a ≤ 0 ≤ b. Otherwise, an intermediate good firm also
needs to pay a fixed adjustment cost, ft, measured in units of labor and drawn from
a time-invariant uniform distribution U : [0, f ] → [0, 1]. Adjustment cost shocks
8In order to lighten the notation in this place of the text, we omit a j-index to refer to the
intermediate good firm being modeled, one among the continuum of intermediate good firms in
our model.
9
are iid across firms and over time. Labor used in the production of intermediate
goods is denoted by L̃t, and Dt is meant to indicate dividends, measured in terms of
the aggregate good. Each intermediate good firm produces its output by combining
labor, L̃t, with its predetermined capital stock, Kt. The corresponding parameters
in the production function are ν and α, and wt denotes the real wage. Total factor
productivity is common across intermediate good firms and evolves according to
z0e
γt.9 Finally, xt is an intermediate good firm’s idiosyncratic productivity, which
is assumed to follow a Markov chain.
2.3 Retail Firms
Retail firms introduce the New Keynesian (NK) elements into our model. Since
the details of the NK model have been discussed elsewhere (see, e.g., Woodford
(2003) or Galí (2015) for textbook treatments) we turn directly to the implied set
of optimality conditions. A standard representation reads
Πt =
[
θp + (1− θp) (p∗t )
1−ε] 11−ε , (9)
qMt =
1
Mt
, (10)
ΦtP
∗
t = µpΥtPt, (11)
where Πt ≡ PtPt−1 , and θp is the Calvo parameter, i.e., the probability according to
which a firm is not allowed to change price in a given period. We have also used
the notation p∗t ≡
P ∗t
Pt−1
for the optimal newly set price, P ∗t , that is chosen by all
time t price-setters in our model, relative to the price of the consumption good one
period earlier. The average price markup in period t is Mt, and µp ≡ εε−1 denotes
9In Khan and Thomas (2008) total factor productivity is stochastic. This difference is ex-
plained by our research question. In fact, we restrict our attention to the monetary transmission
mechanism.
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the desired frictionless markup. Finally, Φt and Υt are functions of the form
Φt = Yt + θpEt
{
Πεt,t+1Qt,t+1Φt+1
}
,
Υt = Yt + θpEt
{
Πε+1t,t+1Qt,t+1Υt+1
}
,
where Yt denotes aggregate output, defined as a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate of the same
form as the consumption aggregate.
2.4 To Close the Model
All markets are assumed to clear. Specifically, the aggregate goods market clearing
condition reads
Yt = Ct +
∫ 1
0
Ψ (Kt (j) , Kt+1 (j)) dj, (12)
where Kt (j) is meant to indicate intermediate good firm j’s time t capital stock.
The labor market clearing condition is of the form
Lt =
∫ 1
0
L̃t (j) dj +
∫ 1
0
ft (j) J
(
it (j)
Kt (j)
)
dj,
where J (x) = 0, if x ∈ [a, b], and J (x) = 1 otherwise. Finally, we follow Walsh
(2005) in assuming a monetary policy rule of the form
Rt = (Rt−1)
ρr
[
Π
β
(
Πt
Π
)γπ (Yt
Y
)γy]1−ρr
eer,t . (13)
Parameters γπ and γy indicate the long-run responsiveness of the nominal interest
rate to changes in current inflation and output,10 respectively, and parameter ρr
10Usually, the output gap, i.e., the ratio between equilibrium output and natural output (defined
as the equilibrium output under flexible prices) enters the specification of monetary policy. Notice,
however, that natural output does not change in response to a monetary disturbance.
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measures interest rate smoothing. We adopt the convention that a variable without
time subscript indicates its steady state value. The shock, er,t, is i.i.d. with zero
mean.
2.5 Baseline Calibration
We consider a quarterly model. There are three sets of parameters. For the para-
meters in the first set we assign values that are standard in the NK literature. They
are shown in table 1.
[Table 1 about here]
We wish to make our model consistent with the micro facts on lumpy investment
reported in Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006). This means that we add the serial
correlation in investment rates to the targets that are also considered in Khan and
Thomas (2008). Nevertheless, some of their modeling choices are still an excellent
starting point for our purposes. However, since the length of a period corresponds
to one year in their model, we had to adjust some of the parameter values that are
taken from Khan and Thomas (2008) in an appropriate way. We also set the rate of
depreciation, δ, to a value that makes our model consistent with the conventional
10% annual rate of investment in the stationary distribution. Those parameter
values belong to the second set, and they are shown in table 2.
[Table 2 about here]
As Khan and Thomas (2008) do, we model idiosyncratic productivity shocks and
the Markov chain determining their evolution by discretizing a log-normal process
log εt+1 = ρε log εt + ηt,
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where ηt is iid with standard deviation ση. We also follow Khan and Thomas
(2008) in assuming |a| = b. We then choose the parameter values in the third set.
They measure, respectively, the range of exemption from capital adjustment costs
(b), the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic shock to productivity (ση) and the
upper bound of the fixed cost diestribution (f) and convex (εψ) portions of the
capital adjustment cost. At this point, we find it useful to consider two alternative
calibrations. They are shown in table 3. Those parameter values are used in order
to target the objects that are stated in table 4.
[Tables 3 and 4 about here]
The first one is our baseline. In this case, we set εψ to 1.5, combined with
f = 0.9 and ση = 0.08. This makes our model consistent with both a plausible
number of investment spikes and a realistic persistence in annual investment rates
at the firm level. We also choose b = 0.011/4. This implies that there is no inaction
nor any negative investment in the stationary distribution of our model. Intuitively,
negative investment is unattractive to firms in the presence of substantial costs of
adjusting the capital stock, and in this high costs environment variations of the
range of exemption give rise to abrupt changes in the frequency of inactive firms.
In order not to have a knife-edge result for this frequency, we simply choose a range
of exemption for which all investment is positive. This is different in the calibration
that is called "Low Capital Adjustment Costs" in table 4. In this case, we set
f = 0.008, a value that is close to the one chosen in Khan and Thomas (2008).
The convex portion of the capital adjustment cost is correspondingly also much
smaller than in the baseline. Concretely, we set εψ = 0.0063. When combined with
ση = 0.037 and b = 0.0096 this calibration makes our model reasonably consistent
with the micro-facts reported in Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006).
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For future reference, let us also mention two additional calibrations. The term
"Khan and Thomas (2008)" in table 4 is meant to indicate a version of "Low Capital
Adjustment Costs" that takes away the convex portion of the capital adjustment
cost from that specification. All the remaining parameter values are held constant,
and also in this version of the model the representative household spends one third of
time working in the labor market. The problematic aspect of the "Khan and Thomas
(2008)" model is that it does not allow us to target the positive serial correlation
in investment rates, which is one of the micro-facts that have been established by
Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006). The label "Traditional" model in table 3 refers to
a version of our baseline without any idiosyncratic productivity shocks and without
any range of exemption from the fixed capital adjustment cost. The models in
Thomas (2002) and Reiter et al. (2013) would also fall into this category. The (well
know) problematic aspects of "Traditional" models are manyfold. For instance,
they imply that a very large portion of positive investment takes the form of an
investment spike.
2.6 Solution Method
We solve the model by linearization around the stationary state without aggregate
shocks (see Reiter 2009), using almost-exact state aggregation (see Reiter 2010).
The details of how to handle the non-convexity of the firm problem are explained in
Reiter (2019). We solve the firm problem on a discrete grid. For the value function,
we use 400 grid points in the capital dimension, and 51 grid points for idiosyncratic
productivity. We approximate the cross-sectional distribution with 1000 grid points
in the capital dimension, and again 51 grid points for idiosyncratic productivity.
This implies an aggregate state space of about 51000 variables. The loss-less state
reduction shrinks the state space to 367 variables. The loss-less value function
14
reduction writes the 20400 elements of the value function as a linear combination of
157 basis functions. As a robustness check, we add an i.i.d. productivity shock on
top of the Markov productivity shock. The results are almost identical. Similarly,
changing grid sizes has no relevant effect on the results.
3 The Monetary Transmission Mechanism
We wish to isolate the role of a realistic degree of lumpiness in plant-level investment
for the monetary transmission mechanism. It is natural to start by comparing our
baseline calibration to a standard textbook treatment of this mechanism.
3.1 Baseline
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the dynamic consequences of a 100 basis point decrease
in the annualized nominal interest rate. The rate of inflation is also annualized. All
other variables are measured as the respective log deviation of the original variable
from its steady state value.
[Figure1 1 and 2 about here.]
Figure 1 shows the monetary transmission mechanism under our baseline cal-
ibration, whereas figure 2 displays the corresponding outcome under a standard
textbook calibration of our model. In the latter case, the convex adjustment cost
parameter, εψ, is set to 9, there is no fixed cost, no range of exemption and no
idiosyncratic shocks to intermediate goods firms’productivity. The results shown
in figures 1 and 2 are similar, and they also resemble the corresponding outcomes
in Galí (2015, p.69).11 He observes that the dynamic consequences of monetary
policy shocks, as implied by a Calvo pricing model, are (at least qualitatively) con-
11His model does not feature endogenous capital accumulation though.
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sistent with the empirical evidence that has been obtained using structural vector
autoregressive (SVAR) methods. A similar observation can be made for the results
shown in figures 1 and 2. In fact, those calibrations predict that monetary policy
shocks have strong and persistent consequences for real variables. For instance, the
estimates reported by Christiano et al. (2005) indicate that the maximum output
response to an identified monetary policy shock is about 0.5 percent (with 95 per-
cent confidence interval around this point estimate of about ± 0.2).12 After that,
output is estimated to take about one and a half years to revert to its original level
which is in line with the model’s prediction. Christiano et al. (2005) also estimate
a maximum investment response of about one percent (with 95 percent confidence
interval around this point estimate of about ± 0.5). The estimated maximum con-
sumption response is roughly 0.2 percent (with 95 percent confidence interval around
this point estimate of about ± 0.1). By and large, the results shown in figures 1 and
2 are consistent with that evidence. Moreover, both specifications are also able to
capture the observed inertial behavior of inflation, but the maximum inflation re-
sponse lies outside the empirically plausible range. In fact, Christiano et al. (2005)
estimate a maximum inflation response of roughly 0.2 percent (with 95 percent con-
fidence interval around this point estimate of about ± 0.15).13 The reason is, of
course, that price-setting and investment decisions take place in two different sec-
tors of our model. Price-setters therefore do not internalize the consequences of their
price-setting decisions for the marginal costs that they are expecting to face over
the life-time of a newly chosen price. Assuming firm-specific capital would allow
us to deal out of this problem, as analyzed in Sveen and Weinke (2005).14 In the
12The maximum response is estimated to occur about six quarters after the shock. This is one
reason why additional real and nominal frictions are typically added to New Keynesian models in
order to increase their empirical realism. See, e.g., Christiano et al. (2005).
13The estimated maximum inflation response occurs about two years after the shock.
14The basic intuition has been developed in Galí et al. (2001) and Sbordone (2002) in the context
of models featuring decreasing returns to labor resulting from a fixed capital stock at the firm level.
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present paper, however, we wish to focus on the role of investment behavior for the
monetary transmission mechanism. What are the economic mechanisms at work?
3.2 Inspecting the Mechanism
In order to uncover the economic mechanism behind our results we find it useful to
consider the "Low Adjustment Costs" calibration shown in table 4. How does the
monetary transmission mechanism change with respect to our baseline case? Figure
3 illustrates the result.
[Figure 3 about here.]
The dynamic consequences of the monetary policy shock under consideration
are out of line with their empirical SVAR counterpart. In fact, as figure 3 makes
clear, the impact responses of investment and output to a change in the nominal
interest rate become very large and the dynamic consequences of that shock are only
short-lived. For instance, in the period when the monetary shock hits the economy
investment deviates by about seven percent from its steady state value. In other
words, the impact investment response is about seven times larger than the size of the
response that appears to be plausible based on the above mentioned SVAR evidence.
The (S,s) nature of investment decisions is crucial to understand this result. To show
this, one simply needs to follow well-trodden paths. In response to an expansionary
monetary policy shock firms choose to undertake some of the investment activity
that they would have otherwise done later. This is crucially different in the presence
of capital adjustment costs of a size that allow us to entertain a plausible monetary
transmission mechanism, as we have seen in figure 2.
Let us further inspect the economic mechanisms at work. To this end, we com-
Sveen and Weinke (2005) have shown that this simple intuition also helps understand the large
degree of endogenous price stickiness that is implied by the assumption of firm-specific capital.
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pare the monetary transmission mechanism for three versions of our model: (i) "Low
Adjustment Costs", (ii) "Khan and Thomas (2008)", i.e., a version of "Low Ad-
justment Costs" where only the convex portion of the capital adjustment cost is
taken away from that specification, (iii) "Traditional", i.e., a version of our base-
line where not only the convex portion of the capital adjustment cost but also the
idiosyncratic productivity shocks as well as the range of exemption from the fixed
capital adjustment cost are taken away. As it turns out, the results are very similar
to the outcome that is shown in figure 3. We saw in table 4 that the small convex
portion of the capital adjustment plays an important role for the "Low Adjustment
Costs" calibration. In fact, as discussed there, without that portion we are unable to
match the positive serial correlation in investment rates that is reported by Cooper
and Haltiwanger (2006). As far as the dynamics are concerned, this version of the
model implies, however, a monetary transmission mechanism that is very similar to
its counterpart under the "Low Adjustment Costs" calibration. The reason is, of
course, that the positive serial correlation in investment rates at the micro level is
relatively small. This puts empirical discipline on the convex adjustment cost para-
meter. We also saw in table 4 that the idiosyncratic productivity shocks combined
with a range of exemption from the fixed capital adjustment cost play an important
role for the "Low Adjustment Costs" calibration. In fact, as documented there,
without those features we are unable to match many aspects of the micro data on
investment. As far as the dynamics are concerned, the "Traditional" version of our
model implies, however, a monetary transmission mechanism that is very similar to
its counterpart under the "Low Adjustment Costs" calibration. The reason why we
find this interesting is as follows. If idiosyncratic factors are relevant for investment
decisions at the micro level, firms will respond differently to aggregate shocks. For
a realistic size of the idiosyncratic shocks, there are always firms just at the margin
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between investing and not investing, which will then change behavior in response to
a change in the interest rate. With larger idiosyncratic shocks, the distribution is
more spread out, and the density at those margins is smaller. This limits the extent
to which firms choose to undertake some of the investment activity that they would
have otherwise done later. The quantitative relevance of this effect is, however, very
small. We also find it interesting to compare our baseline results to a flexible capital
case. The latter is obtained by doing away with the fixed capital adjustment cost
in the context of the "Traditional" model of the monetary transmission mechanism.
Also in this case, the results are very similar to their counterpart under the "Low
Adjustment Costs" calibration. The last result is reminiscent of the irrelevance
results in Thomas (2002) and Khan and Thomas (2008).
4 Conclusion
We introduce lumpy investment into an otherwise standard New Keynesian frame-
work, and our main result shows that a quantitatively relevant monetary transmis-
sion mechanism can be entertained in the context of the resulting model. In the
investment block, we extend the (S,s) model in Khan and Thomas (2008) by al-
lowing for a combination of convex and non-convex capital adjustment costs. The
key insight is that the smooth investment pattern generated by a convex capital
adjustment cost of a size that is normally assumed in the literature on the monetary
transmission mechanism can coexist with investment spikes in yearly investment
rates. At the same time, idiosyncratic shocks to firm-level productivity can gener-
ate the observed small and positive autocorrelation in yearly investment rates. Our
results also show that a calibration with much smaller capital adjustment costs is
even better able to match the micro data on investment at the micro level. In the
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latter case, however, the monetary transmission mechanism becomes counterfactual
due to the extremely large interest rate sensitivity of investment that is implied by
this calibration.
Estimated impulse responses to identified monetary policy shocks have many
other properties that are left out of the focus of this paper, and we have noted that
this is one reason why additional real and nominal frictions are typically added to
New Keynesian models (see, e.g., Christiano et al. 2005). It seems to us that also the
modeling of those additional frictions should be disciplined by the micro data, and
this is another reason why our work is just one more step towards a micro-founded
theory of the monetary transmission mechanism.
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Table 1: New Keynesian Parameters
ε γπ γy ρr θp φ
7 1.5 0.125 0.7 0.75 0.5
Table 2: Parameters in the Spirit of Khan and Thomas (2008)
γ β δ α ν ρε
1.016
1
4 0.977
1
4 0.0187 0.256 0.640 0.859
1
4
Table 3: "Baseline" and "Low Capital Adjustment Costs" (LCAC)
ση b f εψ
Baseline 0.08 0.00275 0.9 1.5
LCAC 0.037 0.0096 0.008 0.0063
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Table 4: Distribution of Plant Investment Rates
Inaction
Positive
Spike
Negative
Spike
Positive
Invest.
Negative
Invest.
Invest.
Autocorr.
Data∗ 0.081 0.186 0.018 0.815 0.104 0.058
Baseline 0.000 0.151 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.054
LCAC 0.085 0.234 0.008 0.758 0.156 0.066
KT (2008) 0.103 0.262 0.024 0.690 0.207 -0.071
Traditional 0.785 0.159 0.000 0.214 0.000 -0.121
∗Establishment data are from Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006).
Inaction |i/k| < 0.01; positive spike, i/k > 0.20; negative spike, i/k < −0.20;
positive investment i/k ≥ 0.01; negative investment, i/k ≤ −0.01; serial correlation of i/k
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Figure 1: Monetary Transmission Mechanism (Baseline)
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Figure 2: Monetary Transmission Mechanism (Standard Textbook Case)
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Figure 3: Monetary Transmission Mechanism (LCAC)
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